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Abstract 
This article is an analysis of the use of public procurement as a 
tool to drive innovation. It explores the meaning of innovative 
procurement or public procurement of innovation, as well as the 
rationale for using public procurement to drive innovation. It 
then focuses on South Africa and evaluates whether there is 
scope within the existing public procurement regulatory regime 
for the promotion of innovation. Barriers in the regime are 
identified and suggestions are made for possible reform. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years the use of public procurement as a tool to drive innovation1 
has received growing attention internationally.2 This use of procurement is 
referred to inter alia as public procurement of innovation (PPI), public 
procurement for innovation (PPfI), innovation-friendly procurement, 
innovative procurement and (in earlier years) public technology 
procurement. The new 2014 European Union Directives on public 
contracts, in particular, make extensive provision for the use of 
procurement as a tool to drive innovation and introduce a new "innovation 
partnership" procedure.3 In essence, the idea is that EU suppliers will 
tender to enter into a partnership with a procuring entity with the aim of 
developing a new product or service (including works, a system or a 
process). Ultimately, the procurement of innovative products and services 
is considered vital for improving the quality and efficiency of public 
services and to address important socio-economic challenges. The 2011 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement also provides for new 
procurement procedures that are aimed at facilitating dialogue between 
procuring entities and suppliers with a view to procuring innovative 
                                            
* Phoebe Bolton. BProc LLB (cum laude) LLM LLD (UWC). Professor of Public 
Procurement Law, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. E-mail: 
pbolton@sun.ac.za. This research was funded by the National Research 
Foundation. 
1  The term "innovation" as used here refers to the procurement of new or substantially 
new products or services and not to how the procurement process is conducted and 
the manner in which the procedures employed can be more innovative. 
2 See generally Lember, Kattel and Kalvet Public Procurement; Angel and Blay 2014 
Eur Procurement & Pub Private Partnership L Rev 3-11; Rolfstam Public 
Procurement and Innovation; Georghiou et al 2010 
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/ 
api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:217123&datastreamId=FULL-
TEXT.PDF; Kattel and Lember 2010 http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper31.pdf; Hommen and 
Rolfstam 2009 JOPP 17-56; OECD Demand-side Innovation Policies; Edquist and 
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1757-1769. 
3  The new EU directives were approved by the European Parliament on 15 January 
2014. The old EU Directives 2004/17 and 2004/18 were replaced with three new 
directives, two of which deal with "classic" and "utilities" public procurement and the 
third with concession contracts. See Directive 2014/24/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on Public Procurement and 
Repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (the new 2014 EU Public Procurement Directive); 
Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on Procurement by Entities operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and 
Postal Services Sectors and Repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (the new 2014 EU 
Public Utilities Directive); and Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the Award of Concession Contracts (the new 
2014 EU Concessions Directive).  
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products.4 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) further claims that innovative procurement:5 
… has proven to be an effective measure in many countries and suggests 
for developed as well as developing countries to introduce their own 
[innovative procurement] policies as part of the demand-side innovation 
policy mix. Moreover, [the] OECD is of the opinion that [innovative 
procurement] related programs, even in developed countries, must be 
accelerated and expanded "wherever possible". 
The use of public procurement to drive innovation has also picked up 
momentum in countries such as Canada, China, New Zealand, India and 
Japan.6 The aim of this paper is to explore the use of public procurement 
to drive innovation in South Africa and to determine whether there is scope 
within the existing legal framework for such use. The paper will be 
confined, in the main, to an analysis of section 217 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), the Preferential 
Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA)7 that has been enacted to 
give effect to section 217(3) of the Constitution, and the Regulations that 
have been promulgated under this Act.8 Where relevant, reference will 
also be made to other procurement-specific legislation and policy 
documents. An analysis of the role that innovation plays or could 
potentially play in the construction and defense industries falls outside the 
scope of this paper. The paper will also not enquire into the role that 
innovation plays or could potentially play in the public-private partnership 
(PPP) context.  
First, attention will be given to the meaning of innovative procurement or 
public procurement of innovation, as well as the rationale for using public 
procurement to drive innovation. The focus will then shift to the role (if any) 
that innovative procurement currently plays and can potentially play in the 
South African context. Barriers in the regulatory regime will be identified 
and suggestions will be made on how the existing barriers could 
potentially be addressed.  
                                            
4  The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011) is a framework law and 
was adopted as a template for developing and reforming regulatory systems for 
public procurement. It has proven to be very successful and has formed the basis of 
procurement law in more than 30 countries across the world. See Arrowsmith and 
Nicholas "UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement" ch 1. 
5 Kattel and Lember 2010 http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper31.pdf 4 – referring to OECD 
Reviews of Innovation Policy 9.  
6  See Rolfstam Public Procurement and Innovation 1 and the sources referred to 
there. 
7  Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 (the PPPFA). 
8  GN 502 in GG 34350 of 8 June 2011 (Preferential Procurement Regulations). 
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2 Public procurement of innovation: meaning and 
rationale 
The term "public procurement" generally refers to the purchase of goods 
and services by government or public entities to fulfil their various 
functions. Value for money or procurement on the best possible terms is 
usually considered of primary importance in this purchasing exercise, but 
for many years the purchasing power of governments has been used to 
achieve secondary, collateral or horizontal policies as well.9 Over the 
years the range of public policies that public procurement can promote has 
also broadened. Not too long ago the use of public procurement to protect 
the environment was at the forefront, and more recently the use of public 
procurement to stimulate innovation is receiving growing attention. The 
purchasing power of governments is being recognised as a demand-side-
oriented tool that can influence and stimulate innovation. It is being 
recognised, in particular, for the key role that it can play to drive innovation 
in areas that are generally the preserve of the public sector such as health 
services, education, energy, transport and firefighting. 
In essence, "innovative procurement" or "PPI" refers to the purchase of a 
good that is not yet in existence or that is in existence but whose design 
and production will require further, if not completely new technological 
development, for example by means of research and development (R&D). 
A possible reason for this may be to enable the government to obtain a 
cheaper or more cost-effective good. The accepted view is that innovative 
products and services reflect higher quality and / or more competitive 
prices and will generally optimise public service operation by integrating 
new processes, technologies or materials.10 The idea, therefore, is for 
governments to encourage suppliers to develop their capacity for 
innovation. As the largest purchaser of goods and services in a country, 
governments can serve as the lead customer or first client of innovative 
products and can foster and accelerate access to the market for innovative 
solutions.  
                                            
9  See generally Caranta and Trybus Green and Social Procurement; Arrowsmith and 
Kunzlik Social and Environmental Policies; McCrudden Buying Social Justice. On 
Africa, see Bolton Government Procurement in South Africa ch 10 and Quinot 
"Promotion of Social Policy" ch 15.  
10  See the summary on how the new 2014 EU Directives incorporate innovation in Fact 
Sheet 9 – EU 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/ 
docs/modernising_rules/reform/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-09-innovation_en.pdf. 
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It seems important here to highlight that there is a difference between 
innovative procurement and what can be referred to as "regular 
procurement" or "conventional procurement". The latter would refer to the 
purchase of ready-made products or off-the-shelf items like pens and 
paper that do not involve R&D. There is, in other words, no innovation 
involved and it is usually only the price and the quality of the product that 
is taken into account when choosing a winning bidder.11 When engaging in 
"innovative procurement", however, price in itself would be viewed more 
holistically. Procurement procedures would take into account the total life-
cycle cost of purchases when evaluating tenders. Innovative tenders may, 
in other words, be awarded more points given their long-term financial 
benefits. With innovative procurement, suppliers would also be allowed to 
tender variants with the aim of proposing the best solutions to meet the 
needs of the procuring entity.12 When using procurement to drive 
innovation, therefore, procuring entities should avoid restrictions on 
innovation, especially when use is made of labels when drafting tender 
specifications.13 Overly detailed specifications, for example, may limit the 
ability and creativity of potential suppliers to offer innovative solutions. To 
avoid different interpretations of the concept of "innovation" in the EU 
member states, the EU Public Procurement Directive, for example, defines 
the term "innovation" as: 
the implementation of a new or significantly improved good, service or 
process, including but not limited to production, building or construction 
processes, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in 
business practices, workplace organization or external relations inter alia 
with the purpose of helping to solve societal challenges or to support the 
Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.14 
Public Procurement as a tool to drive innovation can further be 
categorized as either direct or general, or specific or catalytic.15 Direct or 
general PPI refers to a situation where the procuring entity is also the end-
user of the product that is procured. The procuring entity, in other words, 
simply uses its own demand or need to stimulate or encourage innovation. 
The resulting innovation is, however, often also spread to other users and 
can thus be beneficial for the procuring entity as well as society as a 
                                            
11  In the South African context, and as will be explained in more detail below, "equity" 
or "preference" also plays a role in the award of public contracts.  
12  See for example Recital 48 and art 45 of the new 2014 EU Public Procurement 
Directive. 
13  Angel and Blay 2014 Eur Procurement & Pub Private Partnership L Rev 4-5. 
14  Article 2(1)(22) in the "Scope, Definitions and General Principles" section of the new 
2014 EU Procurement Directive. For an analysis of this definition, see Angel and 
Blay 2014 Eur Procurement & Pub Private Partnership L Rev 5-6.  
15  See Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1757. 
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whole.16 Specific or catalytic PPI refers to a situation where the procuring 
entity "serves as a catalyst, coordinator and technical resource for the 
benefit of end-users".17 The need or demand is, in other words, found 
outside the procuring entity, who procures the new products not for itself, 
ie for its own mission requirements, but for others. Direct and catalytic 
procurement is thus tied to the user of the resulting product. Direct 
procurement is often related to infrastructure development18 or to support 
the missions of the procuring entity itself.19 Catalytic procurement on the 
other hand is used to support "infant" products or industries and is meant 
to serve private demand.20 
PPI can also be categorised with reference to the character of the result of 
the procurement process; in other words, the character of the innovation 
which is embedded in the resulting product.21 In this sense, PPI can either 
be adaptive or developmental. Adaptive PPI is "when the product or 
system procured is incremental and new only to the country (or region) of 
procurement".22 Innovation is therefore required to adapt the product to the 
specific national or local conditions. Developmental PPI on the other hand 
implies that "completely new to the world" products or systems are created 
as a result of the procurement process.23 It can thus be referred to as 
"creation oriented" PPI and involves radical innovation.24 It is important to 
note, however, that examples of the implementation of the public 
procurement of innovation in a number of EU member states shows that 
incremental innovations feature most often, and not radical innovations. 
The possibilities for the procurement of radical innovations occur only on 
very rare occasions in practice.25 
                                            
16  Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1758-1759. 
17  Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1759. 
18  For example the procurement of the X2000 high-speed train in Sweden, where the 
Swedish State Railway Company was the user and the major social need was 
human mobility (transport). 
19  An example here is the US Federal Aviation Administration, which procured an 
"Automatic Dependent Surveilance-Broadcast System" to replace existing ground-
based radars.  
20  For example Sweden's light corridor project which was aimed at increasing energy 
efficiency. See further Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 
1757, 1760, 1763, 1765. 
21  Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1763. 
22  Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1759. 
23  Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1759. 
24  Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1759. 
25  For an overview of public procurement of innovation in a number of EU member 
countries, see EU Project OMC-PTP 2009 http://de.koinno-
bmwi.de/system/publications/files/000/000/040/original/Exploring_public_procureme
nt_as_a_Strategic_Innovation_Policy_Mix_Instrument.pdf?1372758315 65-73. 
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A typical PPI process may include the following stages:  
1. The identification of a "grand" need or challenge and its formulation 
in terms of a lack of satisfaction of a human need or an unsolved 
societal problem. 
2. The translation of the identified need or challenge into functional 
specifications.26 
3. A tendering process that entails the opening of a competition by 
means of a tender process; the translation of the functional 
specifications into technical specifications by potential suppliers; 
and the submission of formal tenders by potential suppliers. 
4. The evaluation of tenders and the awarding of contracts. 
5. The delivery process, which includes product development, the 
production of the product, and final delivery to the procuring entity.27 
During the above stages there will also be extensive dialogue or 
"cooperation" between the procuring entity and suppliers, which 
distinguishes the PPI process from the regular or conventional tender 
process.28 In the conventional tender process, detailed specifications are 
drafted by the procuring entity and there is, as a rule, no or very little 
dialogue between the procuring entity and interested suppliers, which 
accordingly makes this procedure generally unsuitable for the 
procurement of innovative products.  
To sum up, therefore, public procurement of innovation can be justified on 
a number of grounds. As the provider of goods and services such as 
infrastructure, public information and defence, etcetera governments can 
ensure the provision of better or at least more efficient public services by 
making use of innovative technologies.29 There are a number of specific 
areas, such as the health sector, that could benefit from innovative 
                                            
26  The term "functional specifications" as used here would refer for example to the 
expected outcome or end result of the procurement process. In contrast, the term 
"technical specifications" would refer to how the end result of the procurement 
process will be or should be achieved.  
27 Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 Research Policy 1757, 1759. 
28  See the case studies discussed by Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012 
Research Policy 1757, 1760-1766. 
29  OECD Demand-side Innovation Policies 37. 
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technology.30 Innovative procurement practices can potentially result in 
cost savings for the government and also create opportunities for 
employment.31  
Lastly, it is important to note that innovative procurement or the 
procurement of innovation (as referred to in this paper) should not be 
confused with "innovation in procurement". The latter would refer for 
example to the use of electronic procurement and new procedures or 
procurement methods, such as the competitive dialogue procedure that 
was introduced at EU level in 2004. When focusing in paragraph 3 below 
on the position in South Africa and in particular the different ways in which 
current obstacles to the use of procurement to drive innovation may be 
addressed, reference will be made to the potential use of a new 
procurement procedure,32 but this does not detract from the fact that this 
paper is concerned with "innovative procurement", ie the procurement of 
innovation which involves the purchase of products or services that are 
new or substantially new and whose development usually involves 
significant R&D expenditure. In some instances, however, an innovative 
procurement process can assist in the procurement of innovative products 
and services.  
3 South Africa's regulatory regime33 
The size of public procurement in South Africa is estimated to be around 
22% of gross domestic product (GDP),34 and the most recent annual 
procurement spend is in the region of R500bn.35 Given its economic and 
political importance, this function of the government is extensively 
regulated. Most importantly, public procurement is constitutionalised. 
Section 217(1) of the Constitution requires procuring entities to procure 
goods and services in a manner that is fair, equitable, transparent, 
                                            
30  EU Project OMC-PTP 2009 http://de.koinno-bmwi.de/system/publications/files/000/ 
000/040/original/Exploring_public_procurement_as_a_Strategic_Innovation_Policy_
Mix_Instrument.pdf?1372758315. 
31  For the state of unemployment on the African continent, see AFP 2013 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Africas-unemployment-figures-frightening-
20131121. For unemployment figures in South Africa, see Trading Economics 2016 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate. 
32  See, in particular, para 3.2.2 below. 
33  For an in-depth analysis, see Bolton Government Procurement in South Africa and 
for more recent work, see Bolton "Regulatory Framework for Public Procurement" ch 
9. Also see Penfold and Reyburn "Public Procurement" ch 25 and De la Harpe 
Public Procurement Law. 
34  Audet 2002 OECD Journal on Budgeting 180. 
35  Scott 2016 http://www.cips.org/supply-management/news/2016/february/south-
africa-to-reform-public-procurement-processes/. 
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competitive and cost-effective.36 Provision is also made, however, for the 
use of procurement for horizontal purposes. Procuring entities are allowed 
to implement procurement policies that provide for "categories of 
preference in the allocation of contracts"37 and "the protection or 
advancement of persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination".38 This horizontal use of procurement must comply with a 
national legislative framework, however. The Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act (PPPFA)39 was enacted in 2000 to provide a 
framework for the implementation of preferential procurement policies and 
revised Regulations to the Act were released in 2011.40 The Regulations 
were revised, inter alia, to bring them more in line with South Africa's 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act,41  enacted in 2003. The 
aim of the latter Act is, inter alia, to establish a legislative framework for 
the promotion of black economic empowerment (BEE) in South Africa.42  
Aside from the procurement clause in the Constitution (section 217) and 
the PPPFA and its Regulations, there is also a wide array of legislation 
and policy documents that regulate the procurement practices of procuring 
entities. Of particular importance are the Public Finance Management Act 
(PFMA)43 and its Supply Chain Management Regulations (PFMA SCM 
Regulations)44 which regulate financial matters and more specifically 
procurement practices at national and provincial government level. At local 
government level, the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management 
Act (MFMA)45 and its Supply Chain Management Regulations (MFMA 
SCM Regulations)46 find application. From an organisational point of view, 
the National Treasury is tasked with overseeing government expenditure 
and thus also procurement.47  
                                            
36  The term "procuring entities" as used here refers in broad terms to government or 
public entities such as departments, municipalities and state-owned enterprises (like 
ESKOM, TELKOM and TRANSNET). 
37  Section 217(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
38  Section 217(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
39  Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 (the PPPFA). 
40  GN 502 in GG 34350 of 8 June 2011 (Preferential Procurement Regulations). 
41  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. 
42  See the Preamble to the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 
2003. 
43  Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. 
44  GN 225 in GG 27388 of 15 March 2005 (Treasury Regulations for Departments, 
Trading Entities, Constitutional Entities and Public Entities) – see in particular 
Regulation 16. 
45  Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (the MFMA). 
46  Gen N 868 in GG 27636 of 30 May 2005 (Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003: 
Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations). 
47  See National Treasury 2016 http://www.treasury.gov.za. 
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As seen, section 217 of the Constitution mandates the use of procurement 
for horizontal purposes. Thus far, this use has been confined primarily to 
addressing past apartheid policies and practices.48 For the purposes of 
this paper, however, it will be important to determine whether section 217 
provides scope also for the use of procurement to drive innovation. It will 
also be necessary to analyse the PPPFA and its Regulations since this is 
the legislation that provides a national framework for the implementation of 
horizontal policies. In particular, attention will be given to certain key 
stages in the procurement process to determine whether the current 
legislative regime leaves scope for the incorporation of innovation. Barriers 
to the use of procurement to drive innovation will be identified and 
suggestions will be made on how these barriers could potentially be 
addressed. 
3.1 Section 217 of the Constitution  
On a reading of section 217, it is clear that using procurement as a means 
to address past apartheid injustices is of the utmost importance. This is 
clear from section 217(2)(b) in particular, which allows procuring entities to 
implement procurement policies that provide for "the protection or 
advancement of persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination". Of importance, however, is that section 217(2)(a) speaks 
of a much broader use of procurement for horizontal purposes; it provides 
(simply) for the implementation of a procurement policy providing for 
"categories of preference in the allocation of contracts". It is clear, 
therefore, that in the same way that the protection of the environment 
could, for example, be read into section 217(2)(a) of the Constitution,49 the 
use of procurement to drive innovation could similarly be read into this 
provision. Section 217(2)(a) leaves scope for procuring entities to 
incorporate environmental considerations into the procurement process 
and in the same way it can be argued that section 217(2)(a) leaves scope 
for procuring entities to incorporate innovation-related criteria into the 
procurement process. 
A few years ago, for example, the government introduced a "reservation 
scheme". This was done in terms of Regulation 9 of the 2011 PPPFA 
Regulations, which allow procuring entities to give preference to "locally 
produced goods, services or works or locally manufactured goods, with a 
stipulated minimum threshold for local production and content". The 
                                            
48  See, for example, Quinot "Promotion of Social Policy" 467; Bolton and Quinot "Social 
Policies in Procurement" ch 16; Bolton 2004 SALJ 619-635. 
49  See Bolton 2008 TSAR 39. 
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Department of Trade and Industry subsequently designated industries, 
sectors and sub-sectors for local production at a specified level of local 
content. 50 Certain contracts are, in other words, reserved for local 
production with minimum local content thresholds. It is clear that this 
reservation scheme falls neatly under section 217(2)(a) of the Constitution, 
which as noted above provides simply for "categories of preference in the 
allocation of contracts". In a similar fashion, therefore, section 217(1)(a) 
provides scope for the incorporation of innovation-related criteria in the 
procurement process. 
Having determined that section 217 of the Constitution provides scope for 
the use of procurement to drive innovation, it needs to be determined 
whether scope is provided also in the legislation. Barriers in the legislation 
will be identified and possible solutions will be offered.  
3.2 The legislative regime: barriers and possible solutions 
As noted, the PPPFA and Regulations provide a national framework for 
the implementation of preferential procurement policies. In particular, 
section 2(1)(d) of the PPPFA deals with the goals that "may" be pursued 
by means of preferential procurement policies. Of importance is that this 
provision, by using the word "may" (as opposed to "must") is drafted in 
broad terms. The goals for which preferential procurement "may" be used 
are not restricted to the goals specifically mentioned, ie contracting with 
persons or categories of persons historically disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability; and implementing 
the programmes of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
Section 5(1) of the PPPFA further provides that "[t]he Minister [of Finance] 
may make regulations regarding any matter that may be necessary or 
expedient to prescribe in order to achieve the objects of this Act". The 
Minister is thus given the authority to promote innovation in procurement. 
There is, in other words, scope in the PPPFA for the use of procurement 
to drive innovation. 
In what follows, specific attention will be given to the role (if any) that 
innovation currently plays in the PPPFA and Regulations. Where relevant, 
attention will also be given to other procurement-specific legislation and 
government documents. The three main stages of the procurement 
process will be analysed, ie the planning stage, the evaluation and award 
stage, and the contract performance stage. In particular, the focus will be 
                                            
50  More information on the reservation scheme is available at dti 2016 
http://www.dti.gov.za/industrial_development/ip.jsp. 
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on the following key events: (1) the determination of a need and the 
communication of that need to suppliers; (2) procurement procedures or 
methods of procurement and whether these are conducive to the use of 
procurement to drive innovation; (3) the consideration of unsolicited offers; 
(4) the evaluation of quality or functionality; (5) award criteria; and (6) 
contract performance conditions. Barriers that currently hinder the 
promotion of innovation will be highlighted and suggestions will be made 
on how these could potentially be addressed.  
3.2.1 The determination of a need and communicating such need to 
suppliers 
To promote innovation a procuring entity would, during the planning stage, 
have to identify the need for an innovative product or service that cannot 
be met through buying goods or services already available in the market. 
The procuring entity would further have to stipulate the expected outcome 
or end result of the procurement process and not how the end result of the 
procurement process will be or should be achieved. The procuring entity 
would, in other words, have to make use of "functional specifications" as 
opposed to "technical specifications" when communicating its need to 
potential suppliers.51 Thus, the procuring entity must not be too 
descriptive; it must "[not] over-specify – as this can kill innovation".52 Also, 
in those instances where a procuring entity must be specific, it should still 
provide suppliers with the scope to offer variants, ie offers that propose a 
different approach to those suggested by the procuring entity.  
Insofar as could be determined, no express provision is made in the 
legislation for the procurement of innovative goods or services. The 
legislation also does not expressly encourage procuring entities to do so. 
The legislation moreover simply refers to the term "specifications".53 In 
other words, no distinction is drawn between "technical specifications" and 
"functional specifications". The MFMA SCM Regulations do, however, note 
that specifications must "where possible be described in terms of 
performance required rather than in terms of descriptive characteristics for 
design".54 Limited scope is therefore provided for innovative procurement. 
Of note is that the PFMA and SCM Regulations as well as the PPPFA and 
its Regulations are silent on the use of specifications.  
                                            
51  Also see section 1 of the paper for further clarity on the difference between 
"functional specifications" and "technical specifications".  
52  Semple date unknown https://www.innovation-procurement.org/fileadmin/editor-
content/Guides/PPI-Platform_Guide_new-final_download.pdf. 
53  See for example MFMA SCM Regulation 27 and PFMA SCM Regulation 16A6.2(b). 
54  MFMA SCM Regulation 27(2)(c). 
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To identify the need for an innovative product or service and to 
subsequently evaluate offers received a procuring entity would clearly 
require the necessary expertise, or it would require the assistance of third 
parties, which may be quite costly. Given the monetary implications of 
using the assistance of third parties and moreover the lack of knowledge, 
skills and capacity of procurement personnel in South Africa,55 the 
identification of innovative needs may be particularly challenging in South 
Africa. Even in developed countries there is doubt as to the ability of 
procurement personnel to identify innovative needs and subsequently 
evaluate offers received.56  
In the EU, provision is made for a "preliminary market consultation" with 
third parties prior to the identification of an innovative need.57 The parties 
consulted are then also likely to be future bidders. Provision is made, 
however, for how to guarantee that competition and equal treatment is not 
distorted, which goes some way in dispelling the concern that prior 
consultations with a future bidder will result in the award of the contract to 
such a bidder. What this signifies is that using procurement to drive 
innovation depends largely on communication with suppliers. This, once 
again, ties in with the need for procurement personnel in South Africa to 
have the necessary knowledge, skills and capacity. 
3.2.2 Procurement procedures or methods or procurement 
As noted in paragraph 2 above, an innovative procurement process can 
assist in the procurement of innovative products and services. In this 
respect, the current procurement procedures provided for in South Africa 
are not conducive to the promotion of innovation in procurement. A 
distinction is generally drawn between four types of procurement: petty 
cash purchases, verbal or written quotations, written price quotations and 
competitive bidding.58 The regulatory regime therefore provides in the 
main for standard procurement procedures. The general rule is that no 
negotiations may take place between procuring entities and bidders. 
Procuring entities are, as a rule, required to draft detailed specifications 
and must evaluate offers with reference to pre-determined specifications.59 
                                            
55  For more on this, see para 3.3.1 below. 
56  See Sanchez-Graells 2015 
http://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2015/04/innovation-partnerships-under-reg-
31.html?rq=innovation%20partnership.  
57  See art 40 of the EU Public Procurement Directive. 
58  Regulation 12(1) of the MFMA SCM Regulations; National Treasury Practice Note 
SCM 2. 
59  For more on this, see generally Bolton 2006 Stell LR. 
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The timescales for the existing procurement procedures are, moreover, 
around 21-30 days.60 This is too short a time frame for innovative 
procurement and to promote creative dialogue between the procuring 
entity and potential suppliers. 
Provision is made, however, for exceptions to the prescribed use of the 
standard competitive bidding process.61 At local government level 
procuring entities may, for example, do away with competitive bidding 
procedures if doing so is impractical, as in the case of "emergencies" or a 
"sole supplier".62 In such instances procurement may take place by other 
means such as price quotations or direct negotiations, provided that a 
record is kept of the reasons for deviating from an invitation for competitive 
bids and that such reasons are approved by the relevant authority.63 
Similar rules apply at national and provincial government level.64 It would 
appear, therefore that limited scope is provided for the possible award of a 
contract to a sole supplier for innovation-related reasons. The award of 
such contracts is examined in greater detail in paragraph 3.2.3 below, 
where detailed attention is given to the consideration of unsolicited offers. 
It is submitted that in order for there to be effective procurement of 
innovative goods and services, it is important for a specific procurement 
procedure to be in place that allows close contact between a procuring 
entity and the potential supplier(s). It is only this "close contact" that will 
make it possible for innovative procurement to take place.65 Interaction 
between the procuring entity and the supplier(s) is, in other words, of 
fundamental importance. It is submitted that the two-stage bidding process 
provided for at local government level66 could potentially be used for the 
procurement of innovation, provided of course express provision is also 
made for it in the legislation that applies to procuring entities at national 
                                            
60  See PFMA SCM Regulation 16A6.3(c) and MFMA SCM Regulation 22(1)(b)(i) read 
with Regulation 22(2). 
61  For national and provincial government level, see PFMA SCM Regulation 16A6.4 
and National Treasury Practice Note SCM 2. For local government level, see MFMA 
SCM Regulation 36(1)(a).  
62  Para 4.4 of National Treasury Practice Note SCM 2. 
63  Para 4.4 of National Treasury Practice Note SCM 2. 
64 See PFMA SCM Regulation 16A6.4. At local government level, procuring entities 
may also dispense with official procurement processes (including tender procedures) 
for "the acquisition of special works of art or historical objects where specifications 
are difficult to compile"; and for the acquisition of animals for zoos (MFMA SCM 
Regulations 36(1)(a)(iii) and 36(1)(a)(iv)). 
65  Also see Georghiou et al 2010 https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/ 
datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:217123&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF 
5. 
66  See MFMA SCM Regulation 25. 
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and provincial government level. The two-stage bidding process at local 
government level is intended for large, complex projects; projects where it 
may be undesirable to prepare complete, detailed technical specifications; 
or long-term projects with a duration period exceeding three years.67 In the 
first stage, technical proposals on conceptual design or performance 
specifications should be invited, subject to technical as well as commercial 
clarifications and adjustments. In the second stage, final technical 
proposals and priced bids should be invited.  
At present very little information is provided in the Regulations themselves 
on how precisely the two-stage bidding process is supposed to operate in 
practice. The National Treasury's Supply Chain Management Guide for 
Accounting Officers of Municipalities and Municipal Entities,68 however, 
provides guidance on the use of the procedure and in doing so does leave 
room for the use of the procedure to procure innovations. The process 
also appears to comply with the requirements in section 217 of the 
Constitution. It is nevertheless submitted that to combat possible abuse it 
is important for proper safeguards to be put in place when use is made of 
this procedure. In particular, provision should be made for records to be 
kept by procuring entities that specifically deal with two-stage bidding. 
Records should be required to reflect, inter alia, the following: the different 
occasions on which use was made of two-stage bidding; the reasons for 
having used two-stage bidding as opposed to a (single) call for tenders; 
the number of suppliers who were invited to submit proposals and the 
details of such proposals; the number and names of the suppliers who 
were ultimately invited to submit tenders; the details of the winning 
supplier's tender; and the reasons for its selection.69 
An alternative to using the two-stage bidding process expressly provided 
for at local government level may be to introduce a completely new 
procurement procedure. Such a procedure could take the form of the 
"innovation partnership" procedure that is provided for in the new 2014 EU 
Public Procurement Directive or the "request for proposals with dialogue" 
procedure introduced by the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement.70  
                                            
67  MFMA SCM Regulation 25(1). 
68  National Treasury 2005 http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/MFMA/Guidelines/ 
Guide%20for%20Municipal%20Accounting%20Officers_1.pdf. 
69  Also see Bright Public Procurement Handbook 25. 
70  See art 49 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011). 
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It is submitted that given that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement is a framework law and is intended to be used by countries 
that are reforming their procurement systems, the "request for proposals 
with dialogue" procedure (as opposed to the "innovation partnership" 
procedure in the EU) may be a more suitable option. The procedure is 
designed for the procurement of relatively complex items and services and 
allows procuring entities to seek innovative solutions to technical issues, 
such as saving energy, achieving sustainable procurement or 
infrastructure needs, where there may be different technical solutions.71 A 
main condition for the use of this procedure is that it must not be 
objectively possible for the procuring entity to formulate a complete 
description of the subject matter of the procurement at the start of the 
procedure, and the procuring entity must foresee that it will need to 
engage in dialogue with suppliers in order to come to acceptable solutions 
to satisfy its needs. Other conditions for the use of the "request for 
proposals with dialogue" procedure include a prior failure of open 
tendering, and the procedure can be used for research and development 
or for the preservation of essential security interests.72  
The request for proposals with dialogue procedure contained in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law would as a rule comply with the broad 
requirements contained in section 217(1) of the Constitution and is hence 
a potentially viable procedure that can be used to procure innovative 
goods and services in South Africa.  
3.2.3 Unsolicited offers 
As noted in paragraph 2 above, provision is made in the PFMA SCM 
Regulations and the MFMA SCM Regulations for exceptions to the 
prescribed use of the standard competitive bidding process. In particular, 
procurement may take place by other means, such as price quotations or 
direct negotiations if there is only one provider (a sole supplier) of the 
particular goods or services. Scope is thus provided for the award of a 
contract to a sole supplier for innovation-related reasons. The National 
Treasury has, by means of a Practice Note,73 made provision for the 
consideration of unsolicited offers, i.e. offers that are received outside the 
normal procurement processes. In the Practice Note a number of 
requirements are laid down for the consideration of unsolicited offers by 
procuring entities, and one of these relates specifically to the innovative 
                                            
71  Nicholas 2012 PPLR 117.  
72  See art 30(2)(b)-(d) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011). 
73  National Treasury Practice Note 11. 
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nature of the product or service. It is important, therefore, to analyse the 
Practice Note to determine how provision is made for the use of 
procurement to drive innovation. 
On a reading of the Practice Note it is clear that a strict process is in place 
for the consideration of unsolicited offers. This is understandable given the 
nature of unsolicited offers (they are received outside a normal 
procurement process) and section 217(1) of the Constitution demands that 
procurement procedures be fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective. The Practice Note makes clear that procuring entities are 
not under an obligation to consider unsolicited offers, but they may 
consider them if the following requirements are met:  
(a)  a comprehensive and relevant project feasibility study has established a 
clear business case; and  
(b)  the product or service involves an innovative design; or  
(c)  the product or service involves an innovative approach to project 
development and management; or  
(d)  the product or service presents a new and cost-effective method of 
service delivery.74 
The Practice Note therefore clearly makes express provision for the 
consideration of offers that promote innovation. As noted, however, very 
strict procedures are in place. Amongst other things, the unsolicited offer 
must contain "a statement describing how the [offer] is demonstrably 
innovative and supported by evidence that the proponent is the sole 
provider of the innovation".75 An unsolicited offer will, for example, be 
unacceptable and must be rejected by the procuring entity if, amongst 
other things, it: 
(a) relates to known institutional requirements that can, within reasonable 
and practicable limits, be acquired by conventional competitive bidding 
methods; 
(b)  relates to products or services which are generally available.76 
If all the requirements for consideration are met and the procuring entity 
decides to consider the unsolicited offer, a registered letter must be sent to 
the proponent confirming the procuring entity's decision to consider the 
unsolicited offer. Moreover, if the unsolicited offer: 
                                            
74  National Treasury Practice Note 11 para 2.1. 
75  National Treasury Practice Note 11 para 2.3(c). 
76  National Treasury Practice Note 11 paras 3.1(a) and (b). 
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… complies with the requirement of existing unsolicited bid provisions in 
terms of the National Treasury issued circular entitled 'Implementation of 
Supply Chain Management' (dated 27 October 2004), namely the product or 
service is unique, innovative and provided by a sole provider, the [procuring 
entity] may enter into direct negotiation with the proponent, outside the 
normal competitive bidding process.77 [emphasis added] 
In the case of other compliant unsolicited offers that are not of a PPP 
nature,78 a comprehensive evaluation of the offer must take place, which 
must include, inter alia, a feasibility study, whereafter an unsolicited 
proposal agreement must be concluded with the proponent.79 In essence, 
the unsolicited proposal agreement must make provision inter alia for: 
(a)  [t]he methodology for determining any costs to be reimbursed to the 
proponent, should the procurement processes set out [in the Practice 
Note] result in an award for the product or service being made to a party 
other than the proponent;  
(b)  the procedure for further developing the project and responding to 
issues raised by the institution;  
(c)  the allocation of responsibility for developing bid documents in 
accordance with the institution's supply chain management systems, 
provided that development of the document must always be under the 
supervision of the institution;  
(d)  the information in the unsolicited proposal must be treated as 
confidential; and  
(e)  the purchase of intellectual property rights, if any.80 
Once the unsolicited proposal agreement is concluded, the procuring 
entity must prepare and issue bid documents.81 There must, in other 
words, be a procurement process. A Request for Qualification (RFQ) must 
be prepared, the aim of which is to test the market for the existence of 
other suppliers who are capable of providing the product or service. If 
there is no adequate response to the RFQ, a draft contract must be 
prepared. If, however, there is one of more adequate responses to the 
RFQ, a draft contract and a Request for Proposals (RFP) must be 
prepared. A competitive bidding process must then be conducted among 
the suppliers who qualified as well as the proponent who (initially) 
                                            
77  National Treasury Practice Note 11 para 4.2.1.1. 
78  As noted in para 1 above, this paper will not consider the role that innovation 
currently plays or could potentially play in the PPP context. The manner in which the 
Practice Note makes provision for compliant unsolicited offers in the PPP context will 
therefore not be analysed. 
79 National Treasury Practice Note 11 para 4.2.3 
80  National Treasury Practice Note 11 para 4.2.4.1. 
81  National Treasury Practice Note 11 para 5. 
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submitted the unsolicited offer. The proponent must be reimbursed if it is 
not ultimately awarded the contract. The Practice Note further makes clear 
that where use is made of independent consultants or experts to assist in 
the evaluation of unsolicited offers, such consultants or experts must 
undertake not to disclose any confidential material or information provided 
by the proponent of the unsolicited offer to unauthorised persons or 
entities.82 
The manner in which provision is made in the Practice Note for the 
consideration of unsolicited offers that involve innovation can be 
commended. Due regard is given to the requirements in section 217(1) of 
the Constitution to ensure, in particular, that the process aims to be 
transparent, competitive and fair. Provision is also made for the protection 
of confidential material and information provided by the proponent of the 
unsolicited offer. It is submitted, however, that to ensure compliance with 
the strict processes in the Practice Note for the consideration of 
unsolicited offers, it will be important for procurement personnel to have 
the necessary skills, knowledge and capacity. The current lack of skills 
and capacity of procurement personnel is likely to hinder the effective use 
of unsolicited offers to drive innovation. This is examined in greater detail 
in paragraph 3.3.1 below, where attention is given to non-legislative / 
general barriers that will impact on and hinder the use of procurement to 
drive innovation. 
3.2.4 The evaluation of quality / functionality 
The PPPFA Regulations make extensive provision for the role that quality 
(referred to as functionality in the Regulations) should play in the 
procurement process.83 Of importance is that functionality is defined as: 
the measurement according to predetermined norms, as set out in the tender 
documents, of a service or commodity that is designed to be practical and 
useful, working or operating, taking into account, among other factors, the 
quality, reliability, viability and durability of a service and the technical 
capacity and ability of a tenderer.84  
This definition is relatively vague.85 It is generally accepted, however, that 
quality / functionality would refer to criteria such as the nature, quality, 
reliability, viability and durability of the product or service offered; the 
experience and track record of a supplier; the technical knowledge and 
                                            
82  National Treasury Practice Note 11 para 6.1(a). 
83  See Regulation 4 of the PPPFA Regulations. 
84  Regulation 1(k) of the PPPFA Regulations. Emphasis added. 
85  For comments on the definition, see Quinot 2014 PER/PELJ 1114. 
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capacity of a supplier; the availability of tools or equipment for the 
supplier's use; the qualifications and competence of the personnel of a 
supplier; and the number of staff employed; etc.86 It is submitted that in the 
light of the fact that the phrase "among other factors" is included in the 
definition of "functionality", innovation-related criteria could potentially fall 
within the scope of the definition. Procuring entities could, in other words, 
list innovation-related criteria as functionality criteria.  
The PPPFA Regulations make clear, however, that a procuring entity must 
first determine if functionality is relevant to the particular procurement.87 If 
so, suppliers must be informed that offers will be evaluated on the basis of 
functionality.88 The evaluation criteria for measuring functionality must be 
objective89 and suppliers must be informed of the following: (1) the 
evaluation criteria for measuring functionality; (2) the weight of each 
criterion; (3) the applicable values; and (4) the minimum qualifying score 
for functionality.90 An offer must be regarded as acceptable only if it meets 
the minimum qualifying score for functionality91 and all offers that have 
achieved the minimum qualifying score for functionality must be evaluated 
further during the award stage.92  
Innovation-related criteria can therefore potentially serve as functionality 
criteria under the PPPFA Regulations. The fixed way in which the 
functionality provisions are drafted, however, may serve as a hindrance to 
the effective use of innovation-related criteria as functionality criteria. In 
particular, the "minimum qualifying score" for functionality that suppliers 
must obtain may hinder innovation. With innovative products and services, 
suppliers should ideally be encouraged to strive for excellence as opposed 
to simply meeting minimum requirements. Those suppliers who exceed 
the stipulated minimum requirements are, moreover, not rewarded under 
the present regime. All suppliers who comply with the minimum score for 
functionality, and hence innovation-related criteria, must in terms of the 
Regulations be assessed equally thereafter, ie in the award stage. The 
only exception, as discussed in greater detail in paragraph 3.2.5 below, is 
where two suppliers score equal points during the award stage for both 
price and preference, in which case the contract must be awarded to the 
supplier who has the higher functionality score. 
                                            
86  See further Bolton 2014 Speculum Juris 1-26. 
87  Regulation 4 of the PPPFA Regulations. 
88 Regulation 4(1) of the PPPFA Regulations. 
89  Regulation 4(2) of the PPPFA Regulations. 
90  Regulation 4(3) of the PPPFA Regulations. 
91 Regulation 4(4) of the PPPFA Regulations. 
92  Regulation 5 of the PPPFA Regulations. 
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To circumvent the generally accepted meaning of a "minimum qualifying 
score" for functionality, for example that suppliers should score 80 out of 
100, it could be argued that a procuring entity may, for example, inform 
suppliers that the evaluation criteria for measuring functionality relate only 
to innovation-related criteria and that the overall minimum qualifying score 
is 100%. Only suppliers who meet this score would then qualify for further 
evaluation during the award stage. Again, however, procurement 
personnel would require the necessary skills and expertise, which is 
examined in greater detail in paragraph 3.3.1 below. 
3.2.5 Award criteria 
The award stage of the procurement process incorporates a 90/10 and 
80/20 points system that is used to evaluate and award contracts.93 For 
contracts up to a value of R1 million, 80 points are allocated for price and 
20 points for BBBEE criteria and for contracts over R1 million, 90 points 
are allocated for price and 10 points for BBBEE criteria. Depending on the 
value of the contracts, suppliers are awarded points out of 80 or 90 for 
price, and they are awarded points out of 20 or 10 for BBBEE criteria. The 
supplier who scores the highest total score out of 100 is then awarded the 
contract. Of particular note is that no express provision is made for the 
allocation of points other than on the basis of price and BBBEE criteria. 
The score that a supplier obtains for BBBEE criteria is presently tied to 
certain core elements that are laid down in the Codes of Good Practice on 
Black Economic Empowerment,94 ie ownership, management control, 
skills development, enterprise and supplier development, and socio-
economic development.95 No mention is made of innovation.  
The PPPFA and Regulations do, however, provide for the award of a 
contract to a supplier who does not score the highest total points on the 
basis of price and BBBEE criteria if "objective criteria" are present to justify 
such an award.96 This is, in other words, the exception for the award of a 
contract to a supplier who does not score the highest total points. The 
question, therefore, is whether functionality criteria and more specifically 
innovation-related functionality criteria could serve as "objective criteria" to 
justify the award a contract to a supplier who does not score the highest 
total points. The High Court in the case of Rainbow Civils CC v Minister of 
                                            
93  See s 2(1) of the PPPFA and Regulations 5 and 6 of the PPPFA Regulations. 
94  Gen N 1019 in GG 36928 of 11 October 2013 (Codes of Good Practice). 
95  Para 8.1 of the Codes of Good Practice. 
96  See s 2(1)(f) of the PPPFA and Regulation 7(1) of the PPPFA Regulations. 
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Transport and Public Works, Western Cape97 decided in 2013 that 
functionality criteria must play a role also after the award of points for price 
and preference. In other words, functionality criteria must serve as both 
qualification and award criteria. The court held that even though the 
general rule is that a contract must, in terms of the legislation, be awarded 
to the highest scoring bidder on the basis of price and preference, 
functionality criteria may serve as "objective criteria" for the award of a 
contract to a bidder other than the highest scoring one. The court relied 
specifically on section 2(1)(f) of the PPPFA.  
As argued elsewhere,98 even though section 2(1)(f) of the PPPFA provides 
for the award of a contract to a supplier other than the highest scoring one, 
the "objective criteria" that may justify such an award are highly 
constrained. The 2011 PPPFA Regulations are very precise on the award 
of points for preference. The manner in which functionality criteria have 
further been provided for in the Regulations does not qualify them as 
"objective criteria" for the purposes of section 2(1)(f). From the 
Regulations it is clear that pre-disclosed functionality criteria can justify the 
award of a contract to a bidder who does not score the highest points only 
if two bidders score equally for price and BBBEE criteria.99 This would 
then be the only instance where a supplier who scores high for 
functionality stands a chance of winning the contract on the basis of its 
functionality score. Moreover, unless innovation-related criteria were 
specifically communicated to suppliers as a functionality criterion, they 
cannot play any role during the award stage. Under the present PPPFA 
regime, therefore, functionality, and hence innovation-related criteria that 
are used as functionality criteria, can as a general rule play a role only as 
qualification criteria. Subject to the exception mentioned, they may not 
play any role during the award stage.  
Insofar as price is concerned, it is important to bear in mind that more 
often than not innovative products are more costly in terms of their initial 
price. It is important therefore to take into account not only the price of the 
respective suppliers, but the total life-cycle cost, running costs and 
maintenance costs when evaluating different offers during the award 
stage. Allocating the highest points for price to the offer priced the lowest 
is therefore not an option when procuring innovative goods or services. 
The notion of "value for money" should thus not be equated with the 
                                            
97  Rainbow Civils CC v Minister of Transport and Public Works, Western Cape 2013 
ZAWCHC 3 (6 February 2013). 
98  Bolton 2014 Speculum Juris 1-26. 
99  See Regulation 11(5)(b) of the PPPFA Regulations. 
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lowest priced offer, but instead with "procurement on the best available 
terms".100 Value for money also means that the supplier is "able to provide 
what is required on the terms agreed".101 The supplier must be able to 
"offer" as well as "deliver".102 In this respect the PPPFA and Regulations 
will serve as a barrier to the procurement of innovation, as reference is 
made simply to the "price" offered by suppliers without indicating whether 
this includes life-cycle costs, running costs and maintenance costs. 
3.2.6 Contract performance conditions 
An analysis of the legislation shows that no express provision is made for 
the inclusion of innovation-related contract performance conditions when 
procuring entities conclude contracts with winning suppliers. This does 
not, of course, deter procuring entities from doing so. Non-compliance with 
the conditions would then result in breach of contract. In the EU 
innovation-related contract performance conditions must be linked to the 
subject-matter of the contract. The innovation condition must, in other 
words, have an impact on the process of performance under the 
contract.103 In the South African context, it would appear that this need not 
necessarily be the case. In terms of the current legislative framework 
suppliers are, for example, awarded points for BBBEE criteria even though 
such criteria do not relate directly to the subject-matter of the contract. 
Innovation-related performance conditions could therefore be directly tied 
to the subject-matter of the contract or not. It would, however, still be 
important to inform suppliers beforehand that innovation-related 
performance conditions may or will be incorporated into the contract 
concluded with the winning supplier. This is, in turn, will require of 
procurement personnel to have the necessary expertise and knowledge, 
which factor is examined in greater detail in paragraph 3.3.1 below.  
3.3 Other barriers and possible solutions 
As is the case in most developing countries, there are a number of 
challenges that procuring entities in South Africa face when confronted 
with regular procurement, in other words, the procurement of ready-made 
and off-the-shelf items that do not require significant or any R&D. An 
examination of these challenges falls outside the scope of this paper. The 
focus in this paragraph will instead be on those challenges or barriers that 
                                            
100  See Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace Regulating Public Procurement 29. 
101  Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace Regulating Public Procurement 30. 
102  Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace Regulating Public Procurement 30. 
103  See art 70 of the EU Public Procurement Directive. 
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will directly impact on and hinder the use of procurement to drive 
innovation.  
3.3.1 Lack of knowledge, skills and capacity 
A drawback in the South African system that will hinder the use of 
procurement to drive innovation is the lack of skills and capacity / lack of 
knowledge and capabilities on the part of procurement personnel.104 Even 
the procurement of off-the-shelf items, in other words, goods that are 
readily available and comparable in the market, currently suffers from a 
lack of proper knowledge, skills and capacity. The National Treasury has 
indicated that plans are underway to professionalise the procurement 
function of procuring entities, but at present (13 June 2016) public 
procurement and in particular the legal aspects of the procurement 
function receive very little attention at tertiary level. It is clear that that 
there is a dire need for procurement personnel to obtain practical 
experience and expertise to procure off-the-shelf items and also innovative 
products and services. Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss105 succinctly point 
out that: 
[t]o fully achieve SCM [supply chain management] objectives, the National 
Treasury provides support by facilitating the development of appropriate 
training materials to government departments, municipalities and municipal 
entities (National Treasury, 2005). However, the shortage of skills has been 
a re-concurrent theme in public discussion. According to Sheoraj (2007), 
skills and capacity shortages have been identified as the single greatest 
impediment to the success of public procurement in South Africa. Adequate 
capacity in the form of appropriate structures with fully skilled and 
professional SCM personnel is a key success factor for proper SCM 
implementation. In some government entities, the quality of SCM personnel's 
skills and ability are well below standard. Migiro and Ambe (2008) assert that 
many SCM actors in the South African public sphere have attended a 
number of training workshops on SCM, but they still lack the appropriate 
knowledge for proper implementation. McCarthy (2006) contends that there 
is a lack of capacity and knowledge by SCM actors to handle procurement 
processes that have led to bad governance. The South African government 
embarks on programmes that educate practitioners, but implementation of its 
programmes always falls short.106 
                                            
104  Also see Georghiou et al 2010 https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/data 
stream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:217123&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF 8. 
105  Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss 2012 JTSCM 250. 
106  Also see Kraemer-Mbula date unknown http://www.cgee.org.br/eventos/arquivos/ 
BRICS-Erika_Mbula1.pdf. The author lists the following shortcomings that hinder the 
procurement of innovations: "great policies, [but] poor implementation and alignment 
with broader policy objectives; knowledge, skills and capacity; monitoring and 
evaluation – no common system data capturing systems; public and private 
corruption … poor alignment between social goals and innovation goals … [and] 
insufficient participation of stakeholders in [the public procurement] process". Ambe 
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The authors also note that: 
[i]nstitutions of higher learning and other service providers have a critical role 
to equip learners and practitioners with appropriate skills and knowledge. 
The capacity for qualified practitioners would only be available when 
educational institutions contribute to the challenge by way of developing a 
curriculum that meets the needs of the country. Such programmes should 
provide for an understanding of the knowledge of the South African public 
sector and its regulations.107 
It is suggested, therefore, that the training of procurement personnel 
receive urgent attention to facilitate the efficient and cost-effective 
procurement of ready-made products as well as innovative goods and 
services. Procurement personnel would have to receive training on how to 
identify the various needs of a procuring entity as well as how to identify 
pressing societal problems to enable them to procure innovative goods. 
3.3.2 Lack of suppliers who are able to deliver 
The availability of suppliers who are able to offer and supply innovative 
solutions may be an obstacle in South Africa. The supplier base in South 
Africa may, in other words, be small, resulting in too low a level of 
competition that may reduce the incentive to innovate. Small firms may 
also lack the necessary resources to innovate.108 This does not, however, 
mean that the South African government should close the door on the use 
of procurement as a tool to drive innovation. In those instances where the 
necessary supplier base is lacking, international suppliers may have to be 
approached. The condition, however, should be that the winning 
international supplier involve local suppliers in the implementation of the 
awarded contract with the aim of transferring knowledge and expertise to 
the local supplier base. 
3.3.3 General obstacles 
Other obstacles that are of a more general nature, but that will also impact 
on the use of procurement to drive innovation, include the problem of 
                                                                                                                       
and Badenhorst-Weiss 2012 JTSCM 242-261 also identify other more general 
challenges to the procurement system, ie non-compliance with supply chain 
management policy and regulations; inadequate planning and the linking of demand 
to the budget; lack of accountability; fraud and corruption; inadequate monitoring and 
evaluation of supply chain management; unethical behaviour; too much 
decentralisation of the procurement system; and ineffectiveness of the BEE policy. 
107  Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss 2012 JTSCM 254-255. 
108  See for example Georghiou et al 2010 https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/ 
api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:217123&datastreamId=FULL-
TEXT.PDF 8. 
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procurement corruption, potential difficulties in relation to the safeguarding 
of the security of intellectual property, and the current lack of joint action 
and collaboration amongst procuring entities. A 2014 report of the Auditor-
General, for example, found that the unauthorized expenditure of public 
funds amounted overall to R2.9-billion per year and irregular expenditure 
to a staggering R28.3-billion, while fruitless and wasteful expenditure rose 
to almost R1.8-billion.109 There is clearly a dire need to ensure the 
effective and efficient use of public funds in South Africa. If suppliers are 
going to be approached by the government to invent new and innovative 
products, it is also imperative for the necessary measures to be in place to 
ensure that security is provided for intellectual property. As noted in 
paragraph 3.2.3 above, the protection of confidential information is 
adequately provided for in the context of unsolicited offers. Insofar as joint 
action and collaboration amongst procuring entities are concerned, it is 
submitted that there is a need for research to be conducted into the 
procurement practices of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in South Africa 
in particular, with a view to determining whether these entities procure 
innovative products and services and the manner in which they do so. 
Collaboration amongst procuring entities in South Africa will go a long way 
to ensuring that innovative procurement becomes a reality. 
4  Concluding remarks 
It is clear that there are a number of regulatory as well as non-regulatory 
obstacles that currently hinder South Africa's use of public procurement to 
drive innovation. An examination of South Africa's public procurement 
regulatory regime makes clear that even though section 217 and in 
particular section 217(2)(a) of the Constitution leaves scope for the 
promotion of innovation in procurement, limited provision is made in the 
legislation for the role that innovation should or could play in the 
procurement function of the government. It is clear that of primary 
importance is the promotion of BBBEE. The procurement legislation is 
generally silent on the use of procurement to drive innovation.  
South Africa's current use of procurement to address past apartheid 
policies and practices is clearly commendable. However, given the 
growing international demand / trend to link procurement to innovation, 
and moreover the need to improve the quality and efficiency of public 
service delivery in South Africa and address the country's socio-economic 
                                            
109  Malunga 2014 http://www.pprotect.org/docs_publications/PAPER%20DPP%20 
STATE%20CONTRACTS_TENDERS.pdf 4. 
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challenges, it is important for procuring entities to use procurement also as 
a tool to drive innovation.110 At present there is limited scope within the 
legal regime for such use, but it has been shown that there are ways in 
which the current barriers can be addressed, which would in turn increase 
the potential for innovative procurement practices. 
There are, moreover, two non-procurement-related policy documents that 
recognise the importance that public procurement can play in fostering 
innovation, which serve as an indication that perhaps there is light at the 
end of the tunnel. The 2014 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP 2014)111 
issued by the government, for example, stipulates that "'[g]overnment has 
significant purchasing power that it can use to stimulate economic 
development and industrial innovation and transform public services".112 In 
the Ten-Year Innovation Plan for 2008-2018 of the Department of Science 
and Technology113 also the link between public procurement and 
innovation is recognised as an area that requires urgent attention. Most 
relevant is that the plan identifies five "grand challenges" ie the Farmer to 
Pharma value chain to strengthen the bio-economy (the aim being for 
South Africa to become a world leader in biotechnology), space science 
and technology (South Africa should be an important contributor to global 
space science and technology), energy security, global-change science 
with a focus on climate change, and human and social dynamics.114 The 
Plan then makes explicit mention inter alia of the role that public 
procurement can play to stimulate innovation. It is stated that: 
[t]he government recognizes the potential to make use of procurement to 
stimulate technological innovation. The challenge is to develop a public 
procurement regulatory framework that supports local innovations, including 
SMMEs and technology start-ups.115 
                                            
110  For information on the state of service delivery in South Africa, see Empowerdex 
2009 
http://www.empowerdex.co.za/Portals/5/docs/Press%20releases/citydex_report.pdf. 
See also Grant 2014 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-12-research-shows-sharp-
increase-in-service-delivery-protests; Kraemer-Mbula date unknown 
http://www.cgee. 
org.br/eventos/arquivos/BRICS-Erika_Mbula1.pdf. 
111  dti Industrial Policy Action Plan. 
112  dti Industrial Policy Action Plan 42. 
113  DST Knowledge-Based Economy. 
114  DST Knowledge-Based Economy 11. 
115  DST Knowledge-Based Economy 32. 
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